Notes - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 174

12. Arrhenius (forthcoming).
13. Parfit (1984, p. 396).
14. Hare (2009, p. 113).
15. Hare (2009, p. 114).
16. Morphing animation software, invented in the 1980s works as follows: if you
put in two images, it produces a sequence of intermediary images. If you play
those images in order, you see one object smoothly transforming into the
other, for instance the president into a chimp.
17. Hare (2009, p. 115).
18. Hare (2009, p. 116).
19. Hare (2009, p. 116).
20. Hare (2009, p. 117).
21. Hare (2009, p. 118).
22. Hare (2009, p. 121). Hare adds a third condition, which is only relevant for
evidential decision theorists. This third condition is: (iii) The state of affairs
you will bring about, supposing you actually take B, is not preferable to the
state of affairs you bring about, supposing you actually take A. For actual
decision theorists the first two conditions are sufficient.
23. Hare (2009, p. 121).
24. Again, Hare adds extra conditions which are required by evidential decision
theory: Say that option O is stable when both of the following hold: (i) There
is no option K such that, supposing you actually take O, you would bring
about a preferable state of affairs by taking K. (ii) There is no option K such
that the state of affairs you will bring about, supposing you actually take K, is
preferable to the state of affairs you will bring about, supposing you actually
take O.
25. Hare (2009, p. 122).
26. Hare (2009, p. 122).
27. Graham (2007, p. 5).
28. For Hare's critical reply to Graham's argument, see: http://experimentalphi-
losophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/2007/05/caspar_hare.
html Hare explains: 'But notice that caring about things being better for any
particular baby you have is not the same as caring about whether you make
things better for your particular baby. Charlotte's preferences conform to
Dominance, so she prefers a state of affairs in which she has baby Q, with
well-being n, and she could have done better for him (WAY better, even),
over a state of affairs in which she has baby Q, with well-being n - dx, and
she could not have done better for him.
'Furthermore, notice that, even if there is this second thing that she cares
about (her making things better for her baby), it is not only her caring about
this second thing that explains why she presses B3 in the three-option case.
As I argued, if she is rational and her preferences conform to Dominance
and she has no further preferences, then she will press B3 in the three-op-
tion case. So she can't say “I press B3 in the three-option case, because S2 has
a feature (my failing to make things better for my child) that I find undesir-
able. S4 does not have this feature, so it's okay for me not to press B3 in the
two option case.” She would press B3 in the three-option case even if she did
not find the feature undesirable.'