Notes - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 171

4. Roberts (1998) accepts this view.
5. Parfit (1984, p. 396).
6. Hare (2007, p. 514).
7. Wasserman (2008, p. 533).
8. Heyd (2009, p. 13).
9. Weinberg (2007).
10. Note that in this example, not only the genetic identities of the beings in
both populations differ, as well as their welfare levels. The number of beings
that exist in each population differs as well. In Appendix A, I explain how the
Wide Person-Affecting Restriction can deal with different number choices. In
order to avoid that complication, one could just as well imagine this example
(and the next) with populations of equal size.
11. Norcross (1999) has brought forward those examples as reasons to dismiss
the (Narrow) Person-Affecting View. Norcross has not considered the Wide
Person-Affecting View.
12. Thus, the Wide Person-Affecting Restriction can deal with different people
choices. As mentioned, in Appendix A I explore how the Wide Person-Affecting
Restriction can deal with cases in which not only different people live in
different outcomes, but also different numbers of people. This is interesting
with respect to the Wide Person-Affecting Restriction as such, but not directly
relevant for the issue of this topic, i.e., the exploration of the implications and
assumptions of Prior Existence Utilitarianism and Total Utilitarianism.
8 Repugnant Conclusion and Expected Misery Argument
1. One implication, concerning transitivity, will be briefly discussed in
Appendix C.
2. For an illuminating discussion of Singer's position concerning intuitions, see
Singer (2005) and Sandberg & Juth (2010).
3. Cohnitz and Häggqvist (2009, p. 3).
4. Cohnitz and Häggqvist (2009, p. 4).
5. Cohnitz and Häggqvist (2009).
6. Singer (2005, p. 346).
7. Schnall et al. (2008).
8. Haidt et al. (1997), Greene (2003), Singer (2005).
9. Cohnitz and Häggqvist (2009, p. 9) distinguish 'three different conceptions
of what philosophical analysis is concerned with that correspond to three
different evaluations of whether intuitions should be considered evidence in
philosophy'.
10. Roeser (2002, p. 11).
11. Rachels (1999).
12. Mill ([1869] 1997).
13. See Rachels (1999), Singer (2009a), and Norcross (1997).
14. Singer (2005, p. 348).
15. Norcross (2008a).
16. Norcross (1997, pp. 158-67).
17. Kagan (1998, p. 15). See also Tännsjö (1998, p. 11) and Hooker (1996,
p. 531).