Notes - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 165

Notes
1 Introduction
1. I will speak about animal-friendly animal husbandry considered as a moral
goal or moral ideal. An ideal can be understood as a model of excellence
or conception of perfection around which people can orient their thoughts
and conduct, both on a private and on a public level. See Brownlee (2010,
pp. 242-3).
2. For example, the American Dietetic Association, which is the world's largest
organization of food and nutrition professionals, claims (2009): 'It is the
position of the American Dietetic Association that appropriately planned
vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful,
nutritionally adequate and may provide health benefits in the prevention
and treatment of certain diseases. Well-planned vegetarian diets are appro-
priate for individuals during all stages of the life cycle including pregnancy,
lactation, infancy, childhood and adolescence and for athletes.'
3. Nussbaum (2006, p. 338).
4. Singer made this suggestion during his presentation at the Minding Animals
Conference, at Newcastle, Australia in July 2009, by clearly opposing animal
suffering, while discussing the killing of animals only by way of questions.
See also Singer (1993, p. 125), where Singer does not principally oppose the
routine killing of at least some animals. More recently, due to new insights
about the capacities of animals such as pigs and fish, Singer (2011, ch. 5) is
more critical about the routine killing of pigs, cattle and the other animals
that usually end up on people's plates.
5. Sandoe and Christiansen (2008, pp. 80-81). See also Animal Ethics Dilemma
( www.ae.imcode.com) , a programme for teaching animal ethics, developed
by Sandoe and others, where the utilitarian position is presented as favouring
animal welfare, while, unlike the 'rights view', not being opposed to the
killing of animals. See also Norcross (2004), who eloquently attacks the
torturing of animals in intensive animal husbandry while not mentioning
whether the routine killing of animals is a moral problem.
6. Francione and Garner (2010); Sandoe and Christiansen (2008, p. 81);
Francione (1996); Francione (2000, ch. 6); Regan (2004, pp. 205-11).
7. Singer (1993, p. 386). See also Singer (2011, p. 107).
8. Jamieson (1984, p. 218).
9. Singer (2011, preface).
10. While some laws seem to acknowledge that animals are sentient creatures
and are morally owed a certain treatment, animals are also still 'things'
according to the law. This makes the legal status of the animal unclear. See
Bordes (2010).
11. This does not mean that a more animal-friendly system must necessarily be
an extensive one. It only means that current intensive systems are conceived
as being bad for animal welfare.
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