Appendices - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 164

or she accepts the Narrow Person-Affecting Restriction. However, this
should not be assumed, as the question at issue is precisely whether a
utilitarian needs to do so.
Furthermore, even if Graham could plausibly dismiss the second
version of Hare's argument, his critique is not directed at nor applicable
to the first version of Hare's argument. Thus, anyway, Graham has not
established the failure of Hare's conclusion. 28
Hare's argument grounds the choice for the better off baby in a
person-affecting notion of morality. Instead of having to claim that the
choice of the better off baby is better simpliciter , Hare can claim that
the choice is better 'for the baby', in a wide sense. Hare employs a Wide
Person-Affecting Restriction. As a reaction to Hare's argument, it has
been noted:
if we really can construct a morphing sequence from pretty much any
person or group of persons to any other person or group, the distinc-
tion between person-affecting and non person-affecting principles
pretty much disappears. 29
Indeed, such a Wide Person-Affecting Restriction would yield the same
results as an Impersonal View, as long as only necessary (present or future)
beings are involved. For instance, in the case described by Hare, the
mother will have her next baby anyway, so 'her next baby' is a neces-
sary being. Only the (genetic) identity and the welfare of the baby will
depend on the choice in question, i.e. when to have it. So, the Wide
Person-Affecting Restriction yields the same results as the Impersonal
View in most cases. It admits of inter-personal aggregation. 30 That is
in line with a core idea of utilitarianism. However, the Wide Person-
Affecting Restriction, as opposed to the Impersonal View, is compatible
with the Prior Existence View on whose welfare to count in the aggre-
gation of welfare. Therefore, it will have different implications about
the evaluation of outcomes when contingent beings are involved.