Appendices - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 159

Given this second assumption, the question rises what is a 'state of affairs',
and how can someone exist in different states of affairs. There are two
rival theories about sameness across states of affairs. Hare works out his
argument for both theories in turn, in order to leave the choice between
them open. His argument works for both theories, though in a different
way. I will show how Hare's argument works for both theories about
sameness across states of affairs, first the 'counterpart theory', and then
the 'real identity across states of affairs theory'. So, let us first assume the
counterpart theory of identity across states of affairs. The counterpart
theory assumes that states of affairs are possible worlds. Ordinary enti-
ties, according to this theory, only exist in the actual world. However,
relevantly similar entities, which would exist in different possible
worlds, are considered counterparts. Assuming this counterpart theory
about sameness across states of affairs, the above-mentioned Personal
Dominance assumption would be spelled out as follows:
Personal Dominance [according to counterpart theory]:
For worlds W i , W k , in which Charlotte-counterparts have counterpart
babies B i , B k , if B i is better off than B k and all other things are appro-
priately equal, then Charlotte ought to prefer that W i be actual. 15
When exactly babies in different worlds are counterparts depends on the
view about personal essence that one accepts. For instance, genetic essen-
tialism would focus on the genetic make-up of the babies, essentialism
about origins would focus on the conditions under which the babies
come into existence, and psychological essentialism would focus on the
babies' present and future psychologies. Again, we do not need to decide
between those theories.
Assuming that identity is not perfectly fragile, Hare constructs a
morphing sequence 16 of intermediary worlds W 1 , W 2 , ... , W n such that
Morphing:
James in W James has a counterpart in W 1 , who has a counterpart in
W 2 , ... , who has a counterpart in W n , who is a counterpart of Jane in
W Jane . 17
The third assumption is that well-being is fine-grained, i.e. that it can be
slightly better or worse. We find that each person in the sequence from
James to Jane is slightly better off than the previous person. Hare calls
this 'up-slope morphing'.
Up-Slope Morphing:
James in W James is worse off than his counterpart in W 1 , who is
worse off than his counterpart in W 2 , ... , who is worse off than her