Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
C. Prior Existence Utilitarianism and Transitivity
In Chapters 8 and 9, I explored some implications of Total Utilitarianism
and Prior Existence Utilitarianism. Here, I will briefly hint at another
possible implication of Prior Existence Utilitarianism, which might
deserve further exploration. It concerns transitivity.
One of the standard criteria for evaluating moral theories is their
consistency, and one aspect of consistency is transitivity. Transitivity
means that if the theory considers choice A all things considered morally
preferable to B, and B all things considered morally preferable to C,
then A must be considered all things considered morally preferable to C
as well. It typically counts as a major objection to an ethical theory if it
yields intransitive moral judgements. If a theory implies that for some
choices A, B and C, A is all things considered morally preferable to B
and B is all things considered morally preferable to C, yet C is all things
considered morally preferable to A, then this is usually considered an
unacceptable implication and proof of the theory's falsity.
Recently, however, the assumption that a moral theory has to be
transitive in order to be rational has been questioned. Following Larry
Temkin and Stuart Rachels, Alex Friedman argues that transitivity cannot
be reasonably required of a moral theory. According to Friedman: 'any
ethical theory complex enough to be even minimally plausible allows
us to generate intransitive sets of preferences'. 6 Intransitivity can occur
if a theory considers several factors morally relevant and if the weight
of each factor varies depending on what is compared. Friedman shows
that intransitivity occurs in a much wider range of cases than was
initially thought. What is more, many common cases of intransitivity
are so-called 'hard' cases: they imply that whatever one does there is
something better one could have done. As intransitivity, according to
Friedman, is unavoidable, he concludes that transitivity should not be
required of moral theories.
Utilitarianism appears to be able to avoid intransitivity because
it accepts only a single relevant factor. The single relevant factor for
moral evaluations, according to utilitarianism, is the amount of welfare
that an outcome entails. If utilitarianism can indeed avoid intransitive
moral judgements, the failure of alternative theories to avoid it might be
conceived as an argument in favour of utilitarianism.
However, Friedman argues that the most plausible version of utilitari-
anism has intransitive implications in 'different-number cases'. In such
cases, utilitarianism in combination with the Total View on aggrega-
tion proves to be implausible, according to Friedman, because it leads to
the Repugnant Conclusion. Accepting the Average View as a method of
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