Appendices - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 150

number choices. Total Utilitarianism can deal with different number
choices in a straight-forward way. However, since its way of dealing with
different number choices leads to counter-intuitive implications, such as the
Repugnant Conclusion, this can hardly be considered an advantage. Prior
Existence Utilitarianism in conjunction with the narrow Person-Affecting
Restriction can also deal with different number choices. It only considers
the welfare of individuals that exist in both outcomes and ignores all the
rest. If no individual exists in both outcomes, it yields the conclusion that
both outcomes are equally good, similar to the OK versus GREAT case
discussed in this topic. Since this is counter-intuitive as well, the fact that
this view can deal with different number choices can hardly be considered
an advantage either. What is needed is a more plausible way of dealing
with different number choices. There is a recent proposal involving satu-
rating counterpart relations, which might be promising (Meacham, 2012).
However, discussing this will be left for another occasion.
Prior Existence Utilitarianism is not a theory about the value of states
of affairs as such; it is only interested in the evaluation of outcomes of
possible actions. In order to decide which outcome is better in the in-vitro
fertilization case, both possible resulting populations are compared in
terms of welfare. In fact, all kinds of populations can be compared with
each other in terms of welfare. For instance, the welfare of a popula-
tion of extraterrestrials on planet A can be compared to a population of
extraterrestrials on planet B. This, however, is not the business of Prior
Existence Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a moral theory, a theory about
what we ought to do. It is not a theory for determining the value of
states of affairs. Of course, axiological considerations, i.e. determining
the value of states of affairs, can be relevant for utilitarianism, but only
if the states of affairs are outcomes of possible actions. Utilitarianism
requires the maximization of welfare, and the Prior Existence View
determines the scope of moral objects.
B. Childless George Case
In Chapter 8 I have shown that Prior Existence Utilitarianism can deal
with the Expected Misery Argument (Parfit's Wretched Child Case).
Here, I will briefly discuss a similar case and show that Prior Existence
Utilitarianism can deal with that case as well. Here is the case:
Childless George
George passes up an opportunity to conceive a child who would,
George has every reason to think, be in continuous misery from the