Conclusions - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 143

condemned on utilitarian grounds as a sign of bad character. After all,
being prepared to let others suffer in that way for one's own satisfac-
tion does usually not contribute to the maximisation of welfare. Prior
Existence Utilitarianism, just like any other form of utilitarianism, can
directly evaluate character, next to acts and other evaluative focal points.
Accepting several evaluative focal points has the consequence that utili-
tarianism is able to account for moral dilemmas. For instance, when a
mother faces the choice between rescuing her own child or several stran-
gers from a burning building, it seems that caring particularly about
one's own child might be a good character, or disposition, in utilitarian
terms. However, in extraordinary cases such as this one, it might lead
to a sub-optimal outcome in terms of welfare. The mother cannot both
have the optimal character and choose the optimal action, both judged
in utilitarian terms. Being able to acknowledge that kind of dilemmas
seems to be an advantage of the acceptance of several direct evaluative
focal points, such as actions and character.
Thus, proponents of Prior Existence Utilitarianism can claim that
there is something morally wrong with parents who want to have such
a miserable child. Furthermore, once the child is actually suffering, Prior
Existence Utilitarianism takes this suffering fully into account, because
by then the child actually exists. As any other form or utilitarianism,
Prior Existence Utilitarianism might then require ending the suffering
of the child by an act of abortion or euthanasia. Thus, Prior Existence
Utilitarianism can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion and it can deal with
the Expected Misery Argument.
Proponents of Total Utilitarianism need not accept the Impersonal
View on what matters in the evaluation of outcomes. Just as proponents
of Prior Existence Utilitarianism, they might accept the Person-Affecting
Restriction, according to which outcomes should be evaluated in terms
of harms and benefits to sentient beings. This, however, is only possible
for proponents of Total Utilitarianism if they accept that bringing a being
into existence can harm or benefit that being. Only then it makes sense
to take into account the possible welfare of contingent beings in the
aggregation of welfare, from a person-affecting perspective. Therefore,
if an adherent to Total Utilitarianism is to accept that outcomes should
be evaluated in terms of harms and benefits to sentient beings, she must
claim that bringing a being into existence can benefit that being. This
view, however, is hard to defend.
Bringing a being into existence cannot benefit or harm that being
because the welfare level of an existing being cannot be compared to
the welfare level of that being before it existed. This is because in case of
non-existence, a being has no welfare level whatsoever. The temptation