Veganism versus Animal-Friendly Animal Husbandry - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 132

this “the replaceability argument”'. 9 In my view, Stephen's view as cited
by Singer expresses the Logic of the Larder, and not the Replaceability
Argument. As I explained, those arguments are related, but not identical.
Strictly speaking, the Logic of the Larder needs not be about replacement
at all. It is rather about adding happy beings to the world and thereby
benefiting them. Singer's reply is directed against what I presented as
the Logic of the Larder, rather than against what I presented as the
Replaceability Argument.
Singer links the Logic of the Larder to the Total View. Singer accepts
the Total View and sees nothing wrong with the underlying logic of
the Logic of the Larder argument as such. The underlying logic is that
adding happy beings to the world is morally just as good as making
existing beings happier. Furthermore, the underlying logic is that causing
a happy being to exist benefits that being. Indeed, Singer claims in this
context: '... it is difficult to explain why we do not do something good
when we knowingly bring a happy being into existence.' 10 Thus, Singer
subscribes to the underlying logic of the Logic of the Larder argument.
Singer's above-mentioned practical counterarguments 'merely' show
that this logic does not serve the case for animal husbandry.
Note that the assumption that bringing a happy being into exist-
ence benefits this being is in contradiction with Singer's suggestion, as
discussed in Chapter 4, that welfare can only be neutral or negative.
Singer made this latter suggestion in order to be able to restrict the scope
of the Replaceability Argument. I already indicated in Chapter 4 that
this move would be at odds with the rest of Singer's work, where he
assumes that welfare can indeed be positive. Singer's acceptance of the
underlying logic of the Logic of the Larder is a clear example. Taking
seriously the view that welfare can only be negative or neutral would
allow Singer to dismiss the Logic of the Larder on a fundamental level.
As we have seen in Chapter 4, it would also imply that most of us would
be better off having not lived.
Unlike Singer, who accepts the Total View and thus seems to accept
the underlying idea of the Logic of the Larder, proponents of the Prior
Existence View will find fault with the Logic of the Larder argument
at a more fundamental level. They can do so without having to accept
that most of us would be better off having not lived. Prior Existence
Utilitarians will deny that existence can be better or worse for an animal
than non-existence. Furthermore, they will hold that outcomes should
be evaluated in terms of what they do for sentient beings, rather than
what they do for the overall quantity of welfare as such. Note that Total
utilitarians, who accept the underlying logic, need to take a position