Repugnant Conclusion and Expected Misery Argument - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 126

Surely there is something wrong with a morality that can ground no
objection to doing A, the sole effect of which is to cause X to come
into existence, and then tells us that we must do what we can to end
the existence of X at the earliest possible stage. 52
I have shown that it is not the case that Prior Existence Utilitarianism
cannot ground any objection to conceiving the child. I have shown
that a utilitarian can object to conceiving the child. Conceiving the
child is a sign of bad character when the intention is to keep the child.
Thus, there is a ground for objecting to it. This objection is available
even before the child exists. Thus, contrary to what has been claimed,
Prior Existence Utilitarianism can account for the judgement that there
is something morally wrong about having the miserable child. Prior
Existence Utilitarianism can subscribe to the judgement that wantonly
causing such miserable beings to exist deserves moral blame. However,
as we have also seen, Prior Existence Utilitarianism cannot condemn
the project as such. Usually, this incapacity would not lead to accept-
ance of any actual suffering. Once the child suffers, the child exists as a
sentient being and Prior Existence Utilitarianism will take its suffering
into account. In the very far-fetched case that Singer sketches - featuring
a couple that wants to have the miserable child, knowing for sure before
conception that the child will be miserable and not being able to have
an abortion or euthanasia - Prior Existence Utilitarianism could indeed
not condemn the action of the parents even though there would be a
suffering child. It could, however, condemn the parents for exhibiting
a bad character.
6 Conclusion
The most infamous implication of Total Utilitarianism is the Repugnant
Conclusion. At the deontic level, this means that a huge population
consisting of very happy beings should develop into a much huger
population consisting of beings whose welfare is only slightly above
zero, given this is the most efficient way to raise the overall amount
of happiness. Prior Existence Utilitarianism can avoid the Repugnant
Conclusion because it does not take into account the possible welfare
of contingent beings. However, precisely the omission of taking into
account the possible welfare of contingent beings seems to lead to an
implication that many consider no less repugnant. Prior Existence
Utilitarianism seems to be unable to account for the intuition that there
is something morally wrong with bringing into existence a being that