Repugnant Conclusion and Expected Misery Argument - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 124

allows uncoupling one's behaviour from that of others, which might
be advantageous for solving collective action dilemmas. 47 However, as
an account of rightness, it seems to me incomplete. It is more plausible
to choose character as one direct evaluative focal point, next to other
direct evaluative focal points, such as acts.
Thus, yet another possibility would be to accept both character and
actions as primary evaluative focal points. When several direct evalua-
tive focal points are accepted, evaluative conflict might occur. This is
the case when, for instance, a right disposition leads to a wrong action,
as in the above-mentioned case of the mother rescuing her own child.
On this version of utilitarianism, a disposition that usually maximises
welfare and is therefore right leads to an action that fails to maximise
welfare and is therefore wrong. In extraordinary circumstances, acting
from a right disposition can lead to a wrong action. The fact that the
disposition leads to a wrong action in a particular case does not make
the disposition wrong. After all, a disposition is judged on the basis of its
general tendency to produce good or bad outcomes.
I do not think that the occurrence of evaluative conflict diminishes
the plausibility of an account of what is morally right. Rather, proposals
for taking away evaluative conflict have been shown to be problematic. 48
The acknowledgement of evaluative conflict even makes utilitarianism
intuitively more plausible. In the case of the mother rescuing her own
child, one could say that her act was morally wrong because she failed
to maximise welfare. However, she acted from a disposition, which is
the right one to have, because it generally (or so we assumed) maxim-
ises welfare. This would account for the tragic conflict that we experi-
ence in the case. If utilitarianism is accepting several focal points, it can
acknowledge this conflict and explain it. I take this to be an attractive
feature, rather than a disadvantage, for this account of rightness. 49
Taking stock of what I have been discussing so far, Prior Existence
Utilitarianism can account for the idea that it is morally blameworthy
to bring into existence a child that would surely have a miserable life.
Prior Existence Utilitarianism can morally condemn the character of
the parents. Let me now explore whether and in how far it can also
condemn the project of having the miserable child.
The problem for Prior Existence Utilitarianism with respect to
condemning the project consists in the fact that the child's existence
depends on the parents' decision about whether to have it. As such, the
possible child is a contingent being, and Prior Existence Utilitarianism
does not take its welfare into account. Prior Existence Utilitarians cannot
argue away this implication. However, Sapontzis has argued that the