Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
Stage (ii) is in itself morally neutral, because a fertilized egg is not a
sentient being, and therefore, as such, it does not count as a moral
object according to utilitarianism. There may be indirect reasons for or
against conceiving such a child. However, as soon as there is a child that
is able to feel anything (stage iii), this child is an actual moral object, an
existent sentient being, and thus its welfare fully counts according to
the Prior Existence View. The point of this distinction is to isolate what
seems to be the most disturbing aspect of the case: the child should
not be allowed to suffer. The Prior Existence View does not allow the
suffering of the child.
The challenging question is whether the Prior Existence View can
accommodate the idea that there is something morally wrong with
having the child, apart from possible negative effects on third parties,
and even before the child actually exists and suffers. Before the child
exists as a sentient being, no harm is done. What can the Prior Existence
View say about conceiving the child or even the intention to do so? If
the parents' intention is to keep the child, the parents can be accused of
having a bad character:
But if such people did exist, they would have a perverted idea of repro-
ducing and parenting and would show, by keeping the child alive for
two miserable years, their willingness to use others merely as means
to their own satisfaction. ... Prior existence utilitarianism can account
for this intuition, since this is an evaluation of character, and prior
existence utilitarianism no more precludes making character evalua-
tions than does the total population view. 32
Let me explain how utilitarianism can take character into account.
Utilitarianism's 'theory of the right' requires maximising welfare. Given
this requirement, the question rises how, more specifically, we should go
about maximising welfare. What should be our focus? Should we always
choose the act that maximises welfare? Should we follow the rules that
generally tend to maximise welfare? Should we adopt motives that are likely
to maximise welfare? Should we do all of these? In order to get a clear idea
of what utilitarianism requires, we must be clear about the 'evaluative focal
points', the focus of moral evaluation. 33 As explained in Chapter 2, direct
utilitarianism can be distinguished from indirect utilitarianism:
Direct utilitarianism applies the principle of rightness directly to all
focal points. There are many possible forms of direct utilitarianism,
depending on what is taken as legitimate evaluative focal point or
Search WWH ::




Custom Search