Repugnant Conclusion and Expected Misery Argument - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 119

point. After having made that point, I will explore whether and to what
extent Prior Existence Utilitarianism can also account for the idea that
the project of having the child as such is morally wrong.
To begin with, it should be noted that the decision of not having the
child can usually be justified even without taking the negative welfare
of the possible child into account. After all, the welfare of others, such
as the parents, the siblings and the 'society in general', would be affected
negatively by having the child. This shows that in practice, the trouble
would be restricted to cases in which the parents would be happy to
have the child and others would not be negatively affected to a degree
that outweighs the parents' welfare gain. (Except, of course, the child
itself. But that does not count.) The problem is restricted to cases in
which the parents want to conceive the miserable child. The question is
how the Prior Existence View can deal with such a case.
As a second preliminary remark, it should be noted that the Prior
Existence View would have no problems with taking into account the
suffering of the child, as soon as the child is actually suffering. By that
time the child is an actual sentient being, and as such it will get full moral
consideration according to Prior Existence Utilitarianism. Unfortunately,
the only thing that could be done at that moment in order to prevent
further suffering of the miserable child would be to kill the child as soon
as it starts to be sentient. Depending on when sentience and in this case
the suffering starts, this could be before or after the child is born. Even
if the child would not be allowed to suffer, the common sense idea may
still be that there is something morally wrong about having this child.
But then, what does 'having the child' mean? Utilitarians can draw a
distinction between 'three stages in the process of bringing a miserable
child into the world that are importantly different in their moral value:

i. intending to conceive such a child,

ii. conceiving such a child, and

iii. keeping such a child alive.'

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Utilitarians have reasons to evaluate those stages separately:

(i) is a bizarre project and expresses bad moral character if the prospec-
tive parents intend to keep the child alive. If, however, they intend
to abort the potentially miserable child before it develops sufficiently
to suffer, then their intention is to satisfy their bizarre compulsion
to conceive in a way that does no direct harm from any utilitarian
viewpoint. 31