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to inquire whether and in how far it matters that a particular moral view
has counter-intuitive implications. In particular, we are interested here
in the utilitarian stance on this issue.
To what extent should intuitions be taken seriously in the evaluation of
moral theories? It is disputed what the status of such intuitions should be.
At first glance, there seem to be two 'extreme' views, which claim either
that moral intuitions are completely irrelevant, or that moral intuitions
are indisputable data that a moral theory should accommodate. I am not
sure whether anybody even pretends to adhere to any of these extreme
positions, but it will be useful to distinguish them for analytical purposes.
Between those extremes, there is a broad spectrum of possible views. That
a view is 'extreme' in that sense, does not establish that it is wrong; nor is
the number of adherents to a view an indicator of its truth.
It is a possible position to deny the relevance of counter-intuitive impli-
cations in the evaluation of a moral theory. According to that position,
it is irrelevant whether a moral theory fits well with existing intuitions.
After all, a moral theory is not intended to be the most comprehensive
summary of our existing moral judgements. Instead, a moral theory
should be able to critically assess common moral practices and judge-
ments. Moral theory should provide a critical point of view vis-à-vis our
convictions. A moral theory should offer a rational justification of moral
judgements, and unmask practices and judgements that are morally
wrong. A moral theory should provide an answer to the question 'How
should I act?' For a utilitarian, a reasonable answer to this question can be:
'Ignore all our ordinary moral judgments, and do what will produce the
best consequences.'
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If there is a convincing story of why and how a moral
theory arrives at its judgements, a need to match with intuitive judge-
ments can be deemed unnecessary. According to that view, if some of our
beliefs are not in line with what the theory requires - so much the worse
for our beliefs. It shows that we are on the wrong track, and we ought to
adjust our beliefs, or at least, not let them influence our actions.
Evidence suggests that intuitive moral judgements are influenced by
many factors. Evolutionary contingencies, upbringing, subconscious
cues, and situational circumstances have all been found to influence
people's spontaneous moral judgements. For instance, in nearly all of
the 200 years of human history, hurting others was only possible in a
direct, face-to-face way. It might have been adaptive for social beings
that depend on each other not to hurt each other, at least within one's
own group. This might be the reason why we tend to feel that it is wrong
to hurt others in face-to-face situations. Hurting others in more indi-
rect ways across distances of time and space is only possible relatively
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