Person-Affecting Restriction and Non-Identity Problem - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 104

OK Fred GREAT Fred

Outcome A Outcome B

Figure 3 Two populations and Fred

After all, Fred's interests alone determine how to choose between both
populations. Fred's interests alone determine whether the population
that he will be part of will consist of people that are barely well off or
very well off. Such a privileged position for one individual seems to be at
odds with the utilitarian duty to neutrally maximize welfare.
This is no knockdown argument. After all, utilitarian proponents of
the Narrow Person-Affecting Restriction could reply that the choice
for outcome A above outcome B in the second above-mentioned
example is in line with the duty to neutrally maximize welfare, inter-
preted as the duty to maximize net benefits to particular individuals.
That is granted. Yet, still this focus on maximizing net benefits of
particular individuals leads us far astray from original utilitarian
concerns with maximizing welfare and impartiality. Concerning the
first of the above-mentioned examples, a utilitarian proponent of the
Narrow Person-Affecting Restriction would be indifferent as to which
outcome to choose if different people would exist in both outcomes.
In the end, no particular individual would be benefited or harmed by
either choice. Again, this indifference between those outcomes seems
to be far removed from the original utilitarian concern with maxi-
mizing welfare.
Couldn't utilitarian proponents of the Impersonal View on the evalua-
tion of outcomes bring forward similar concerns against the Wide Person-
Affecting Restriction? Remember that the Impersonal View evaluates
outcomes solely on the basis of the quantity of welfare that they contain.
It is granted that the Impersonal View is most straightforwardly focused
on the maximization of welfare. However, one may wonder whether util-
itarianism as a moral theory should be concerned with the maximization