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with moral questions. It's exactly the moral implications that are drawn
from these cases that are under scrutiny. Therefore, the relevant notion
of betterness for these cases should be determined by moral theory.
Whatever criterion one appeals to, it has to be made plausible that it
is morally relevant. It can be disputed that the notion of betterness
Parfit appeals to in his case of the 14-year-old girl is the morally relevant
understanding of betterness in non-identity cases. How to determine
notion of betterness is relevant from a moral point of view? The intui-
tion that de re betterness is not what matters leads to the judgement
that the 14-year-old girl should delay conception. But then, what is the
moral relevance of such intuitions?
Which notion of betterness is considered morally relevant depends
on one's understanding of morality and on the moral theory that one
adopts. From a utilitarian perspective, de dicto notion of betterness in
non-identity cases is at least possible. A utilitarian can adopt a minimal
conception of identity as adequate in these cases. This would imply
that genetic make-up, personalities or other characteristics of indi-
viduals are irrelevant when we consider whether we, members of the
present generation, are allowed to destroy the natural resources that
the members of future generations will need. Similarly, when a couple
contemplates their duties concerning the welfare of their possible child,
the child's exact genetic make-up can be deemed irrelevant. Likewise, we
commonly recognize a prospective mother's duty to make things better
for her next child by quitting smoking or by moving to a saver neighbor-
hood. These things are likely to effect when she conceives, and perhaps
even with whom she will end up procreating. So, her moving or her
lifestyle change are not likely to benefit her next child in a de re sense.
Our impact on their welfare is what matters, or so a utilitarian can claim.
According to this wide interpretation of the person-affecting restriction,
it does not matter who exactly 'they' are. So, utilitarians can appeal to a
de-dicto notion of betterness in non-identity cases.
4 Possible criticisms
I will now discuss two possible criticisms that may be launched against
the Wide Person-Affecting Restriction. First, it might be argued that indi-
viduals in the wide, de dicto , sense cannot have interests nor can they be
harmed and benefited. Secondly, it can be argued that the Wide Person-
Affecting Restriction opens to door to the Replaceability Argument and
thus brings back in what the Prior Existence View was supposed to avoid
(Section 4.2).
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