Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
10. Gode, D.D.K., Sunder, S.: Allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders.
Market as a partial substitute for individual rationality. J. Polit. Econ. 101(1), 119-137 (1993)
11. Gode, D.D.K., Sunder, S.: Double auction dynamics: structural effects of non-binding price
controls. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28(9), 1707-1731 (2004)
12. Guerci, E., Rastegar, M., Cincotti, S.: Agent-based modeling and simulation of competitive
wholesale electricity markets. Handbook of Power Systems 3(2), 241-286 (2010)
13. Guerci, E., Ivaldi, S., Raberto, M., Cincotti, S.: Learning oligopolistic competition in elec-
tricity auctions. Computational Intelligence 23(2), 197-220 (2007)
14. Jing, Z., Ngan, H., Wang, Y., Zhang, Y., Wang, J.: Study on the convergence property of
roth-erev learning model in electricity market simulation. In: 8th International Conference
on Advances in Power System Control, Operation and Management (APSCOM 2009), pp.
1-5 (November 2009)
15. Kirschen, D.S., Strbac, G.: Fundamentals of Power System Economics. Wiley (2004)
16. Migliavacca, G.: Srems: a short-medium run electricity market simulator based on game the-
ory and incorporating network constraints. In: Power Tech, 2007 IEEE Lausanne, Switzer-
land, pp. 813-818 (July 2007)
17. Nicolaisen, J., Petrov, V., Tesfatsion, L.: Market power and efficiency in a computational
electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing. IEEE Transactions on Evolu-
tionary Computation 5(5), 504-523 (2001)
18. Nicolaisen, J., Smith, M., Petrov, V., Tesfatsion, L.: Concentration and capacity effects on
electricity market power. In: Proceedings of the 2000 Congress on Evolutionary Computa-
tion, La Jolla, USA, vol. 2, pp. 1041-1047 (2000)
19. Rastegar, M., Guerci, E., Cincotti, S.: Agent-based model of the Italian wholesale electricity
market. In: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the European Energy Market,
EEM 2009 (2009)
20. Roth, A.E., Erev, I.: Learning in extensive form games: Experimental data and simple dy-
namic models in the intermediate term. Games Econ. Behav. 8(1), 164-212 (1995)
21. Ruperez Micola, A., Banal Estaol, A., Bunn, D.W.: Incentives and coordination in vertically
related energy markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 67, 381-393 (2008)
22. Sun, J., Tesfatsion, L.: Dynamic testing of wholesale power market designs: An open-source
agent-based framework. Comput. Econ. 30, 291-327 (2007)
23. TERNA S.p.A.: Individuazione della rete rilevante - italian version only. Tech. rep., TERNA
S.p.A. (2008)
24. Watkins, C., Dayan, P.: Q-learning. Machine Learning 8(3-4), 279-292 (1992)
25. Weidlich, A., Veit, D.J.: Bidding in interrelated day-ahead electricity markets: Insights from
an agent-based simulation model. In: Proceedings of the 29th IAEE International Confer-
ence, Potsdam (2006)
26. Weidlich, A., Veit, D.J.: A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models.
Energy Economics 30, 1728-1759 (2008)
