Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
ing and enforcing smallholder agreements; and (c) designing feasible monitoring
systems. While these (high) costs are justifiable as the
extra costs
required to
achieve more equity and welfare, they are not likely to be underwritten by investors
who are primarily interested in an environmental service and may have other invest-
ment options. Thus, to attract investors to smallholder-oriented program, co-funding
mechanism are needed such as multilateral or bilateral support to cover the higher
costs that assure significant social benefits (CIFOR 2001; Wunder 2007).
21.7.4
Ensuring Dynamic Flexibility
for Co-generating Other Environmental Services
The development of various smallholder agroforestry systems is likely to generate
more than one environmental product and service, such as biodiversity conservation,
eco-tourism, carbon sequestration, and watershed protection. These services gener-
ate benefits to different sectors of society, and as such, could warrant payments to
reduce scarcity and ensure sustainability. Markets for these environmental services
are in different stages of development and it is necessary to assure that they benefit
smallholders. The development of pro-poor payments for any of these environmental
services requires the same enabling conditions. Hence, program design, tree product
marketing, tenure arrangements, and institutions for underwriting transactions costs
need to be flexible to allow for the inclusion, addition, of the multiple products and
services generated by the same tree-based systems (Roshetko et al. 2007a).
21.8
Institutional and Policy Support
Institutional changes and a better understanding of communities, their needs and
perceptions, are clearly imperative if smallholder tree growing activities are to suc-
cessful support sustainable forest management and contribution to livelihood devel-
opment. Within this context, Kant and Berry (2005) point at the need for institutional
analysis that takes into account interactions between both factors of internal rele-
vance to institutions (i.e., the rules, norms, and codes that, whether formal or infor-
mal, define the rights, privileges and obligations of various groups under a regime)
and organizations (i.e., the physical manifestations of institutions) as well as factors
of external relevance (i.e., the “external setting” defined by social, economic, envi-
ronmental, and international features). Their recommendation is based on an analy-
sis of failed forest regimes in India: the ineffectiveness of past forest regimes
proved to be related to the non-complementarities between formal (government-
based) and informal (local, community-based) institutions, leading to adaptive
inefficiency, and the unconstructive organizational culture and perceptions of for-
estry organizations' members. Organizational inertia appeared to be one of the
main factors impeding institutional changes in this case and, thus, institutional
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