Civil Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Nowadays there exist advanced model- and data-based computer systems for
assisting decision makers. They differ from those basing on the manual methodol-
ogy not only in the use of more complex models for assessing all relevant phenom-
ena and quantities, but in particular in their possibility to couple up to emission and
pollution measurements from monitoring networks or stationary or mobile local
stations. Some systems are devoted only to specific topics and tasks. In Germany,
for example, the fields of emergency management and radiation protection are
covered by distinct systems, the remote surveillance systems for nuclear reactors
operated by the German federal states (KF
¨
s) [
3
], and the integrated measurement
and information system (IMIS) [
4
] of the federal government, respectively. There
are also comprehensive systems that cover all radiological protection and recovery
aspects following a nuclear accident, for example the European systems RODOS
[
5
] and ARGOS [
6
], or the American emergency response consequence assessment
tool RASCAL of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [
7
].
Our article presents the Real-time On-line Decision Support System RODOS
which was developed as consequence of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 for off-site
emergency management after nuclear accidents for use in national emergency
centers in Europe. In this context the article also gives insight into the importance
and application of computer-based decision support systems in general and into
concepts and recent developments in German and European radiological emer-
gency management.
Knowledge of basic radiological concepts such as radioactivity, radiation and
dose, is assumed. To facilitate the understanding for readers not familiar with the
subject, the following chapter summarizes relevant radiological phenomena,
the fundamentals of radiological emergency management, and the modeling of the
radiological situation in computer programs. Topics as the data requirements of the
models and the actual availability of data in the different phases of an accident and
the respective uncertainties are also addressed.
All descriptions in the article refer to the assumption of some hypothetical
accidental release of radioactive material. Statements about the probability of
releases from a given facility or specific types of facilities are not made and not
intended.
References
1. Berichte der Strahlenschutzkommission (SSK) (2004) des Bundesministeriums f¨r Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, Heft 37, Leitfaden f¨r den Fachberater Strahlenschutz der
Katastrophenschutzleitung bei kerntechnischen Notf¨llen. Elsevier Urban & Fischer
2. Berichte der Strahlenschutzkommission (SSK) (2010) des Bundesministeriums f¨r Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, Heft 60, auch als CD,
¨
bersicht ¨ber Maßnahmen zur
Verringerung der Strahlenexposition nach Ereignissen mit nicht unerheblichen radiologischen
Auswirkungen (Maßnahmenkatalog). H. Hoffmann GmbH, Berlin
3. Eberbach F (1993) Possible contributions of the KF
¨
systems to decisions for off-site emer-
gency management. Radiat Prot Dosimetry 50:107-112
