The b-Core: Belief-based Coalition Stability - Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty - page 84

according to the solution concept of the core, after different number
of rounds. The result seems to suggest that, according to the concept
of the core, games that are populated with belief-based type-b agents
(Random-B games) obtain less number of stable results than games
populated with non-belief-based type-n agents (Random-N games) in
the long run, despite some gain in the early rounds.

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

20 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

Number of rounds
Random-N Random-B

Fig. 4.8 Comparison of games populated with type-b and type-n agents,
using stability concept of the core.

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

Number of rounds
Random-N Random-B

Fig. 4.9 Comparison of games populated with type-b and type-n agents,
using the stagnant criterion.

However, to the contrary, closer examination of the experiment
data suggests that the story should not be that simple. Recall that