Two Classes of Stability — Strong Core and Weak Core - Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty - page 69

cannot be easily applied to this more general class of non-transferable
utility games.
Agents with case-based decision model
As mentioned above, not all decision systems are probabilistic in na-
ture. For instance, case base reasoning (CBR) is an important decision
making approach in many artificial intelligent systems [11]. In a typ-
ical CBR system, a case base with known outcome is maintained. To
solve a new problem, the attributes of the new problem is compared
against the known cases in the case base. A best match is found and
the outcome of that best match is then used as the proposed solu-
tion for the new problem. CBR is typically used where the problem
space is large so that there are not su cient samples to provide a rea-
sonable probabilistic model for the whole problem space, as required
by the probabilistic approaches. The stability concept we proposed is
much more suitable for multi-agent applications employing such deci-
sion models.
3.8 Summary
Classical coalition formation concepts in game theory are determinis-
tic in nature. That is, they assume the value of each coalition to be
publicly known for certain. However this assumption is not practical
in many software agent applications where intelligent agents have to
rely on whatever evidences they can perceive or their past experiences
to estimate such coalition values. The probabilistic approaches provide
a good alternative in many cases, but are not suitable in some multi-
agent applications where the samples are sparse and where the agents
utility are non-transferable.
In this chapter, we propose a new type of game which we la-
belled non-transferable utility games with uncertainty, and provide
new concepts for describing the stability of coalitions under uncertain-