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which, unlike monetary utility, is obviously not transferable.
We formally define non-transferable utility cooperative games (NTU
Game) as follows. The goal of the game is to partition the set of agents
into a coalition structure of exhaustive and non-overlapping coalitions.
Definition 2.1 (Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games)
A non-transferable utility cooperative game is a tuple
g = N,X,V, ( i ) ,
where
N =
{
a 1 ,a 2 ,...,a n }
is a set of n agents and any subset S
N is called a coalition , X
is a set of consequences, each representing a possible outcomes, and
V is a function which assigns to every nonempty subset S ⊆ N a
set V ( S ) ⊆ X of feasible consequences. Finally, i is the preference
relation of agent a i over X .
Example 2.2 The scenario described before can be formally repre-
sented as an NTU game. If each player of Alice, Bob, Cindy, David,
and Emily is represented by the first letter of his or her given name,
then
N =
{
A, B, C, D, E
}
.
The set X consists of all possible consequences, such as x 1 ='David
and Emily become good friends', x 2 = 'Everyone is bored', x 3 = 'Alice
is frustrated', x 4 = 'Alice is happy', and so on. If we assume that Alice
prefers being happy to being frustrated, then we shall formally denote
this as x 4 A x 3 . Other components of the preference
A of Alice, and
preferences
B ,
C ,
D ,and
E
of all other people, can be defined
accordingly.
Cooperative games, like other branches of game theory, deal with
finding meaningful 'solution concepts' for coalition formations prob-
lems, which are criteria for evaluating the stability of the coalitions.
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