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lowed, and again there are two stable outcomes, namely
{{
a
}
,
{
b
}
,
{
c
}}
and
{{
a, b, c
}}
if we limit ourselves to raisable definite objections only
(Figure 6.6).
Fig. 6.6 Raisable definite objections.
Thus, we can see that some 'stable' outcomes are really more sta-
ble than others: on one hand, we have outcomes such as
,
which is definitely stable, and on the other hand, we have the def-
initely not stable coalition structure (CS) such as
{
a
}
,
{
b
}
,
{
c
}
,and
somewhere in between, we have the “perhaps stable” outcomes such
as
{{
a
}
,
{
b, c
}}
.
Once again, we see that the traditional stability concepts, which
classify each coalition structure as either stable (i.e., in the core) or
not, are insucient in describing games such as this one. The reason
is that we are facing a new type of games, where the agents' decisions
are based on private and possibly uncertain beliefs instead of common
knowledge.
{{
a
}
,
{
b
}
,
{
c
}}
6.3 NTU-BU Games
We will now provide a definition for a type of NTU games with both
types of uncertainties. We define a new type of coalition formation
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