The b-Core: Belief-based Coalition Stability - Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty - page 113

making. In this Chapter, we propose a new type of game which we label
non-transferable utility games with private belief, and provide a new
concept for describing the stability of coalitions of these games, namely,
the b-core. By doing so, we are able to provide useful stability concepts
for this new type of game which otherwise cannot be analysed properly
using the classic common information-based approaches. The model
provides a useful tool in evaluating coalition formation algorithms for
agent-based cooperative games, for the purpose of both ex-ante and
ex-post analyses.

References

[1] Kraus S, Shehory O, Taase G. Coalition formation with uncertain heteroge-

neous information. In Proceedings of the Third International Joint Confer-
ence on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, pp 1-8, 2003.