Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
A number of ontologies have been used to provide an understanding of information
systems. A frequently used ontology is that of Mario Bunge (1977; 1979). Bunge's onto-
logy is exact and well developed. It is characterised by an approach that considers the
real world as known to science and proceeds in a clear and systematic way. Wand and
Weber, alone and with others (e.g. Wand, 1996), have used this ontology in many
studies of modelling information systems. However, it has been noted that Bunge's on-
tology is 'oriented towards the physical world and therefore does not provide for human
perceptions and social context' (Wand 1996). Indeed, Bunge's ontology can be categorised
as one consistent with the philosophical stream of naturalism wherein it is held 'that the
best methods of inquiry in the social sciences or philosophy are … those of the natural
sciences'. Naturalism is ontologically supported by natural science in that it insists that
natural science be used 'in recognising what is real' (Kim and Sosa, 1995) and that 'our
ontology is constrained by the result that all physical bodies are composed entirely of
particles' (Kim and Sosa, 1995). This position is also methodologically difficult to defend
because 'intentional states … are said to be attributable to individuals only relative to
an observer [which is] inconsistent with the objectivity of the methods of natural science'
(Winch, 1958, quoted in Kim and Sosa, 1995).
We have established that scientific works such as those in information systems report
true judgments of people written with intentions revealed in the works and, furthermore,
that people who come from diverse perspectives and with different intentional states
read articles. Naturalism cannot help us, despite rightly being a philosophy committed
to realism (the existence of a world separate from our thinking about it).
Another ontological position that seems to be more amenable to use in the area of human
perceptions is common-sense realism. Commonsensism holds that we really know most,
if not all, of those things which ordinary people claim to know. I know that there exists
at present a living human body, which is my body. I know that the earth has existed
for many years past. These are unambiguous expressions, the meaning of which is widely
understood. It should be noted that there is also an 'entirely different question of
whether we know what it means, in the sense that we are able to give a correct analysis
of its meaning' (Moore, 1925). Commonsensism is not concerned with this latter question.
The common-sense world is delineated by our beliefs about what happens in mesoscopic
reality in most cases and most of the time (Smith, 1995).
This approach does not dismiss the view of the world based on physics. Various proposals
have been made to accommodate the world of physics within common-sense realism.
Proposed alternatives have included treating the common-sense world as truly
autonomous and the world of physics as a cultural artefact. Smith (1995) proposes that
there is an overlap between the common-sense world and the world of physics. Paradigm
shifts in science impact on our common-sense understanding of the physical world.
However, a common-sense ontology does not necessarily need to be rewritten in the
wake of paradigm shifts, contrasting with a naturalist ontology such as Bunge's.
Common-sense realism holds that there is only one world towards which natural cognition
relates, and that this world exists independently of our cognitive relations to it. It con-
cedes that our natural cognitive experiences are in many cases unable to be verified,
but points out that common sense is aware of error in cognitive efforts.
The thesis that there is only one world towards which natural cognition relates
must thus be understood as being compatible with the thesis that there are
many different ways in which the world can appear to human subjects in
different sorts of circumstances (Smith, 1995).
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