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Popper saw the work of science as being to take a theory that is proposed, to deduce an
observational prediction from it, and then to test the prediction. If the prediction fails,
then we have refuted or falsified the theory. If the prediction is supported, then all we
can say is that the theory has not been falsified - yet. This position is referred to as the
'hypothetico-deductive' model and is reasonably common among philosophers of science
and practising scientists.
Popper was not much concerned about where theories come from in the first place, and
was strongly opposed to the use of inductive methods in science; that is, in building or
supporting a theory on the basis of a large number of observations of a certain kind.
Popper has been criticised on these grounds and others have included, in the hypothetico-
deductive model, a first stage in which observations are collected and a conjecture (a
theory) is generated from these observations (Godfrey-Smith, 2003).
Space precludes a detailed treatment of many of the compelling issues that are discussed
under the heading of the philosophy of science. In summary, views that appear useful
in discussion of information system theory, which in synthesis can be referred to as a
'scientific perspective' of theory and theorising follow:
1.
Theories, as systematic and responsibly supported explanations, are the aim of
science. Such explanations may be offered for individual occurrences, for recurring
processes or for invariable as well as statistical regularities. The explanations offered
can rely on different ideas of causality and what constitutes an explanation (Nagel,
1979, p. 15).
2.
Theorising, in part, involves the specification of universal statements in a form that
enables them to be tested against observations of what occurs in the real world
(Popper, 1980).
3.
Some propose a distinction between experimental laws and theories, though the
distinction is not clear-cut (Nagel, 1979). Experimental laws, such as the gas laws,
which relate pressure, temperature and volume in invariant relationships, refer to
'observable' entities in at least a loose sense of the word. Theories, on the other
hand, tend to offer a more comprehensive interrelated set of explanations and in-
clude terms like 'molecule' or 'gene' which are less readily directly observable, re-
lying on assumptions for their definition. This point is interesting because the ex-
perimental laws, which may result from close observation and description of nature,
and not necessarily impute causality, may give rise to a broader scientific theory.
For example, an experimental law arising from observation, such as 'All platypuses
suckle their young', can be eventually fitted into a theory about the nature of
mammals.
4.
It is expected that theories and laws in the social sciences, for a number of reasons,
will be pervasively generalised in statistical terms (e.g. 'most rural Americans belong
to some religious organisation'). Compared with the natural sciences, theories in
the social sciences will have narrower scope, or lower-order generality (Nagel,
1979). This observation is not intended pejoratively as social scientists can still
manage to advance explanations for a large variety of social phenomena.
5.
Dubin (1978) gives a very detailed treatment of how theories can be specified in
the social sciences, which is in accord with the scientific perspective described
here. He describes how theory can be used for both understanding and prediction,
and how ideally it should deal with both process and outcomes.
6.
The development of theory or conjectures in the first place can occur in many ways:
as a result of observations of what occurs in the real world (Nagel, 1979; Godfrey-
Smith, 2003) or from insights, imagination, problems or feelings (Popper, 1980).
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