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The point of this discussion of positivism is that positivism is just one philosophical
perspective on science, and a form that has largely been debunked. Focussing on posit-
ivism as being representative of views about theoretical formulation and epistemology
in science obscures the rich value that can be found in many other writings in the
philosophy of science, as discussed in the following section. The information systems
literature provides many instances where 'positivism' is a label given to various, often
conflicting, impressions of what scientific thought means. This habit is so widespread
that no opprobrium should attach to the identification of particular instances. Positivism
is characterised as being associated with naïve realism, a 'value-free' view of scientific
enquiry, hypothetico-deductive methods, unilateral causal relationships or laws, statist-
ical analysis and so on (see Orlowski and Baroudi, 1991). This depiction obviously does
not match the original tenets of logical positivism, and neither is it compatible with the
writings of prominent philosophers of science (see Nagel, 1979). Discussion of positivism
is lingering on in information systems and our researchers are seemingly unaware that
it is moribund. Orlowski and Baroudi (1991), for example, footnote the possibility that
positivist dogma may be losing its currency among mainstream natural scientists,
seemingly unaware of its recognised killing-off many years previously in what can only
be regarded as very mainstream philosophy of science (Popper, 1936; Passmore, 1967).
The author believes that 'positivism' should no longer be even mentioned as a defensible
position in discussions of theory or epistemology in information systems. If what is
meant is a scientific perspective, then it is better to say so; to go directly to writings in
the philosophy of science and to examine issues separately and carefully. The conclusion
from this summary of positivism is that it is not a fruitful source of ideas on theorising
in information systems.
A 'scientific' perspective
Unfortunately, if we turn to the philosophy of science for views on theory we still find
disagreement on many important issues. Godfrey-Smith (2003) notes that there has been
a state of fermentation in recent years concerning many problems: causality, the distinc-
tion between experimental laws and theories, induction, and the cognitive status of
theories, to name just a few. Some of the views of prominent philosophers that appear
especially relevant to at least some types of information systems theory are discussed
here. Note, however, that the term 'post-positivist' is not appropriate for describing
these views since some are pre-positivist (Hume, Locke, Kant) and some are anti-positivist
(Popper).
Sir Karl Popper is a philosopher of science whose views appeal to many working scientists
and who is regarded as a hero by many (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Popper (1980, p. 59)
gives this view of theory:
Scientific theories are universal statements. Like all linguistic representations
they are systems of signs or symbols. Theories are nets cast to catch what we
call 'the world'; to rationalise, to explain and to master it. We endeavour to
make the mesh ever finer and finer.
Popper sees theories as uncertain and as approximate representations of reality. His on-
tological position recognises theory as having an existence separate from the subjective
understanding of individuals. Theory is an inhabitant of World 3, the objectively existing
but abstract world of man-made entities - language, mathematics, knowledge, science,
art, ethics, and institutions, for example. Other worlds are World 1, the objective world
of material things, and World 2, the subjective world of mental states (Popper, 1986).
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