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forth rules on access and security to personal data, thwarting the efforts of those
who wish to cause harm.
Informational inequality
A second moral reason for the protection of personal data is that it reduces the
negative effects of informational inequality. Since consumers are not always
(fully) aware of the economic opportunities their personal data may present,
and/or not in a position to trade their identity-relevant information in a fair and
transparent market, they may be disadvantaged in the marketplace for identity-
relevant information. Constraints on the flow of personal data need to be put in
place in order to guarantee economic equality of arms, transparency and fairness
(Van den Hoven 2008, p. 313).
While van den Hoven only describes the issue of informational inequality
from a private sector perspective, it is also relevant in the context of the rela-
tionship between governments and citizens. In this realm, informational inequal-
ity is closely associated with personal autonomy. If the government knows a
great deal about its citizens, but is not equally transparent, the balance of power
is upset.
Informational injustice
A third moral reason for data protection is to avoid informational injustice. Infor-
mational injustice occurs when the boundaries of the 'spheres of access' are disre-
spected. People do not mind when there data are being processed for a legitimate
goal (e.g., their medical data being used for their treatment). But if a sphere of ac-
cess is disrespected (e.g., the medical data is being used in a job application pro-
cedure) informational injustice takes place.
Moral autonomy and moral identification
A fourth reason to invoke data protection rules is that they allow us to set a 'dis-
tance' between the outside world and ourselves. This distance is crucial for what
van den Hoven calls 'shaping our own moral biographies' (Van den Hoven 2008,
p. 316). Without the observing gaze of others we can freely develop our thoughts
and our identity. Furthermore, it allows us to present ourselves to the outside
world as we see fit. When the outside world can readily access personal data
across a number of different contexts, the individual's freedom to shape our own
moral biography is reduced.
These moral foundations for protecting personal data are also relevant when we
observe the possible risks of profiling. For instance, stereotyping and de-
individualisation encroach upon our sense of moral autonomy, informational ine-
quality may occur when profiling is surreptitious or when profiles become too
rich, and informational injustice may occur when profiles cross the boundaries of
spheres of access. Therefore, the right to informational privacy and data protection
law are also relevant in the context of profiling.
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