Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
or 8 % of Japanese imports. As a result, fuel costs for electric power companies in-
creased by 94 % from their pre-Fukushima levels of $ 36.2 bn in 2010 to $ 70.9 bn
in 2012's fiscal year. Supporters of using nuclear power say nuclear power is re-
quired because of energy security. The people who argue against say the increase in
fuel cost by import is costly but still less than 1 % of GDP of Japan. This can be a
critical issue- even leading to wars as happened as WWII for Japan. Can we really
afford to be complacent about the current 4 % rate of energy security?
14.4.2.6
Food Risks
After the Fukushima disaster the public became very sensitive to the potential risks
of radiation contamination in food. Despite monitoring programmes and the ease
of checking radiation levels using a Geiger counter, psychological impacts make
selling vegetables or fish from Fukushima extremely difficult. Despite the scientific
observation that levels are lower than in some states in the USA (due to natural
radiation), this concern is not easily overcome. Recent surveys show that the radia-
tion levels in fish from the closed area around Fukushima are only 20 % higher than
fish from unaffected areas. Scientists tell us that it does not affect health. However,
listening to the same message, journalists may choose to say the opposite and write
an article saying it is not safe. So how should such information be communicated?
And will the scientist communicating that information expect the audience to accept
fish from Fukushima or continue to reject it? This can be a useful exercise in the
critical issue of science and risk communication.
14.4.2.7
Disposal of Debris
Normally, the media shows only the areas where damages are very striking and
severe, and as a result, this information can create misunderstanding among the
public concerning the overall situation in all affected areas. For example, the tsu-
nami left a large quantity of debris, and soon the problem of where to dispose of
the debris arose. The initial information and message was that the quantity was too
much to dispose of only in the Tohoku region and that support from other areas was
needed. Therefore, the government requested other prefectures and cities to help in
its disposal by providing a subsidy to those who would agree to accept some of the
debris. A number of cities raised their hands in respond to this request, but in oth-
ers it led to substantial local opposition and much argument. In fact, when a survey
was conducted one month after the disaster, it was found that the quantity of debris
was much less than estimated by the government. Estimating the magnitude of
material stock which has lost its social function as a result of a disaster allows the
quantities required for reconstruction and help to be better understood (the volumes
of waste flows generated by that disaster). Tanikawa et al. (
2014
) showed that the
material stock losses of buildings and road infrastructure were 31.8 million and
