Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
stance, marine habitats might provide inspiration for art or provide opportunities for leisure
and recreation that people do not pay for directly in the market, e.g. there is no charge to
swim in the sea, and yet it is clear that people value such access - it affects their well-be-
ing. Some elements of these benefits afforded to us might be marketable (e.g. the price for
a painting that has been inspired by the ocean, or the premium that we may pay for a hotel
with a sea view or direct access to a beach), but the ability to use what are termed 'surrog-
ate markets' is limited, and approaches that rely on these surrogate markets only partially
This has led to the development of environmental valuation methodologies in eco-
nomics to value such non-marketed benefits that nature provides. The focus has been on
providing a monetary value for these benefits. This has in part been driven by the perceived
need to apply comparisons on a like-for-like basis using a common unit of account, i.e. a
monetary unit (dollars, euros etc.) The standard economic argument in favour of such an
approach is that in the absence of a common metric it is not possible to assess fully the
worth of one proposed policy versus another, and the only common metric that is univer-
sallyacceptedismoney.Soifwecanexpressbenefitsinmonetarytermsthenthisallowsus
to apply cost-benefit analysis (CBA). If the rules of CBA application are adhered to then
wewill bemaking like-for-like comparisons, andtherein CBA can beapplied asaperform-
ance yardstick to appraise policy options.
This rationale is applied by those who advocate the application of environmental eco-
nomic valuation to the EBA to marine management. There are many agents who are affec-
tedbyanymanagement measure orgroupsofmeasures, whichwemaytermamanagement
strategy. If we want to appraise management strategy A versus B then we ought to categor-
ize all the benefits and costs arising from A and B respectively and make a comparison.
We should allow for uncertainty in our estimates, and also consider the timing of any im-
pacts so as to allow for what is termed society's 'positive rate of time preference', i.e. the
presumption that a cost or benefit arising soon in the future affects our welfare more than
that same cost or benefit arising in the distant future. Economics capture this in what is
termed discounting (TEEB,
2010
). Discounting is not discussed further here as it is beyond
