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For example, considering the case of the optogentically remotely controlled rat,
even though the animal still possesses a fully functional biological body (and,
arguably, a functioning brain), the fact that it receives external [optogenetic] com-
mands cannot give rise to a genuine understanding of what the animal is experiencing;
the rat's brain receives alien input that, at best, may resemble drug-induced decon-
textualised hallucinations—mere uninterpreted symbols/squiggles and squoggles—
which will remain meaningless despite how accustomed the animal may become to
this new mode of remotely induced behaviour. The situation is analogous to the alien
hand syndrome—where in patients, for example, see their arm perform actions not
of their volition or under their control. Such patients never ascribe meaning as to why
their arm acted in this way, albeit they can see (and hence comprehend) the actions
in the same way as any other observer; in this sense they are 'external observers' of
their own limb(s) 'zombie movements'.
In contrast we suggest that fully intentional creative acts, as engaged in the process
of genuinely understanding the world, require both a fully functional brain and a fully
functional body; so translating the question of the requirements for 'genuine creative
thinking' to the defining features of the processes whereby the brain and body interact
with the world and society.
In the light of these concerns, until the challenge of the CRA has been fully met,
we urge caution in ascribing 'Strong' notions of creativity to any fundamentally
computational system.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the potential of the swarms in exhibiting 'weak com-
putational creativity'. This specific work described herein uses swarm intelligence
techniques to explore the difference between using Random Freedom and Swarmic
Freedom in the visualisation of the swarms 'tracing' line drawings; this work high-
lights the features of swarm-regulated difference versus simple-random difference in
the production of such 'sketches' by computer. We stressed on the significant impact
of both freedom and constraint on the emergent creativity, and presented a discussion
on how these two concepts are mapped onto exploration and exploitation, two of the
most infamous phases in the swarm intelligence world.
The 'weak computationally creative' artist described herein is the result ofmerging
two swarm intelligence algorithms, preserving freedom (exploration) and constraint
(exploitation).
The Strong computational creativity is presented in ways emphasising:
￿
that genuine creativity implies 'genuine understanding' and other cognitive states.
￿
autonomy, asserting that without 'Strong Embodiment', computational systems
are not genuinely autonomous.
Therefore, we urge caution in ascribing “Strong creativity” to any merely com-
putational system.
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