Weak and Strong Computational Creativity - Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines - page 44

An analogy could be drawn to computational creativity, extending the notion of
weak AI to 'weak computational creativity', which does not go beyond exploring
the simulation of human creativity; emphasising that genuine autonomy and gen-
uine understanding are not the main issues in conceptualising weak computationally
creative systems. Conversely in 'strong computational creativity', the expectation is
that the machine should be autonomous, creative, have 'genuine understanding' and
other cognitive states.
The concept of 'Strong AI'—instantiating a computational machine with genuine
understanding—has provoked many critics, among whom John Searle made perhaps
the most famous attack with his Chinese Room Argument (CRA) [ 33 ] (for com-
prehensive discussion see [ 29 ]). The central claim of the CRA is that computations
alone cannot in principle give rise to understanding, and that therefore computational
theories of mind cannot fully explain human cognition. More formally, Searle stated
that the CRA was an attempt to prove that syntax (rules for the correct formation
of sentences:programs) is not sufficient for semantics (understanding). Combining
this claim with those that programs are formal (syntactical), whereas minds have
semantics, led Searle to conclude that programs are not minds.
But then it is equally clear that Searle accepts that there is no boundary on a fun-
damental level to the idea that a machine can think as in Minds, Brains and Programs
(MBP) Searle [ 33 ], in reply to the inquiry 'Can a machine think?”, expressly states
that the response is clearly 'yes', as we are precisely such machines.
Clearly Searle did not intend the CRA to target machine intelligence per se, but
rather any form of artificial intelligence according to which a machine could have
genuine mental states (e.g. understanding Chinese) purely in virtue of executing an
appropriate series of computations: what Searle coined 'Strong AI'.
Searle contends that understanding, of say a Chinese story, can never emerge
purely as a result of following the procedures prescribed by any machine program,
for in the CRASearle offers a first-individual story delineating precisely howhe could
instantiate such a system, functioning as the Central Processing Unit of a computer,
produce right internal and external state transitions, and even pass a 'Turing test' for
comprehension of Chinese, and yet still not comprehend a single word of Chinese.
In Mind, Brains and Programs, Searle [ 33 ] states that in Strong AI “the computer
is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed
computer really is a mind, in the sense that, computers given the right programs can
be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states”.
Accordingly, in Strong Computational Creativity, we argue that computer is not
merely a tool in the study of the creativity; rather the appropriately programmed
computer really is creative, in the sense that, computers given the right programs
can be literally said to understand its creation and have other cognitive states (e.g.
teleological and emotive) associated with human creative processes.
In other words, the creative human fundamentally knows that s/he is making a
mark on paper (or a computer screen) or moulding clay or making sound etc. Whereas
merely by following the rules of the program, the computer cannot know that it is
doing anything other than manipulating uninterpreted symbols (or squiggles).