Stakeholder Groups in Computational Creativity Research and Practice - Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines - page 5

of the terms involved, whereas the assertion “This picture is a work of art” is likely
to be contested

... because of an evident disagreement as to—and the consequent need for philosophical

elucidation—of the proper general use of the term “work of art” [ 3 , pp.167].

As a recent example, the question of whether videogames should be classed as art
was raised by a Guardian art critic [ 7 ], towhich the Guardian games editor responded:

Here is a good way to tell if a critic is having a moment of madness: they will attempt to
define art. The greatest philosophers in history have floundered on the question, many simply
avoided it altogether, preferring to grapple with more straightforward questions—like

...

the
existence of God. Art is ethereal, boundless, its meaning as transient as the seasons. When
you think you have grasped it, it slips through your fingers [ 8 ].

While this is only one example, it serves as an exemplar of the kinds of debates
that occur daily about the nature of art. While it is true that the preoccupation with
expressing creativity is a relatively modern aspect of the visual arts, if the notion of
art is indeed essentially contested within our culture, then the notion of the creativity
that went into producing a given artwork should be seen accordingly. In particular, a
selection of criteria for what counts as creativity is required in any coherent scheme
for understanding and evaluating creativity in art. This is the perspective advanced
by Jordanous [ 9 ], with which we agree—although we also agree with her point that
there is unlikely to be broad and lasting agreement about just what the precise criteria
of creativity actually are. We can further justify the idea that proper usage of the term
creativity involves endless debate about its proper usage by reference to the multitude
of volumes written about improving, managing and assessing creativity in people,
organisations and society. Indeed, as a society, we are better off if we do not agree
about what creativity means—in the sense that the disputes we have about this are an
engine for change and progress, and it would surely be stultifying if we all suddenly
agreed on this most important of concepts. While it is problematic for various areas of
study—not least Computational Creativity—that creativity is an essentially contested
quality of any person, it is something we need to embrace and even celebrate. For
more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Jordanous [ 9 , Chap.3]. We may ask,
in practice, what does it mean to say someone or something is “creative”? Austin
informally introduced the notion of an illocutionary act as a locution that also serves
to perform another action [ 10 ]. Searle further categorised such speech acts into:
assertives , directives , commissives , expressives and declarations [ 11 ]. Declarations
in particular are understood to change reality in accordance with the proposition
stated. An example of such a speech act is: “I pronounce you husband and wife.” We
believe that—in certain circumstances—people can bestow the reality of a person
being creative simply by stating it. To see this, we recall the contested nature of
creativity, and the assumption that there is no general consensus about what makes
someone creative. It follows that people who are not particularly invested in the
creativity (or lack thereof) of someone else may be swayed by the declarative speech
act of a third party in a position of authority. WhenNicholas Serota, long time director
of the Tate art museums and galleries, says that a piece is a great work of art, that work