Open-Ended Elaborations in Creative Metaphor - Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines - page 224

Anti-Analogy-Extension Thesis . This says that open-ended elaboration in metaphor
should not , normally, be handled by extending already known analogies. ATT-Meta
seeks to get away with the least amount of analogy possible, contra other theories
such as Structure-Mapping Theory [ 11 , 18 , 22 ] which assume that the task is to
maximize the extent of (structurally well-founded) analogy.
I call both the view-specific correspondence rules and the view-neutral mapping
adjuncts standard analogical mapping rules. They are part of an understander's long-
term knowledge. However, suppose an understander is faced with a metaphorical
sentence where there are as yet unparalleled within-pretence items, such as the
nylon in (4), and the sub persons, voices, smallness, insisting and nudging in (5, 6,
7, 12). Such items are ones that are not mappable into the surrounding space by any
standard mappings. Then, the Anti-Analogy-Extension Thesis says that, unless there
are special pressures to act otherwise, understanding does not seek to provide parallels
in the surrounding space for the as-yet-unparalleled items. Rather, the understander
tries to connect these items to within-pretence content that can be converted via
standardmappings. This is on the theoretical principle that, typically, the unparalleled
items are proposed by a speaker not as individually standing for aspects of the target
scenario being addressed, but rather to build a pretended scenario that holistically
illuminates the target side using knowledge of metaphor that the understander is
expected already to have.
In particular, there is no need at all to propose that for examples like (5) and (6)
the mentioned parts and voices correspond to identifiable aspects of the real person,
or to propose that there is some internal, real mental action that can be clearly held
to correspond to the action of insisting in the sentence. Rather, the mentions of parts,
a voice and insisting in (5, 6) are merely tools towards constructing a rich pretended
scenario, which in turn conveys in an economical, accessible and vivid manner the
possession of a particular sort of mental state by Mary.
Similarly, in the neck-crick example (3), the cricks and resultant physical pain
have no parallel in reality. The cricks are only there to convey emotional distress,
difficulty in continuing the conversations, etc. In the nylon constraints example (4),
the speaker is not trying to refer to possible real features of the putative abstract
constraints that correspond to nylon, to being made of nylon, or the general being-
made-of relationship. The being-made-of-nylon is only there to convey information
such as that the speaker cannot see the constraints and to suggest it is not his fault.
Although the nylon itself has no parallel, the nature (whatever it is) of an item in a
pretence is taken to correspond to the (possibly different) nature of a corresponding
item in the surrounding space. Since the nature of the strings in the pretence causes
the politician not to see them, their nature in reality causes him not to be aware of
them in reality (by the Causation-etc. VNMA). But there is no need at all to analyse
the nature of the constraints in order to find items analogous to being-made-of and
(Footnote 16 continued)
application of such assumptions. In brief, it is assumed that if an agent has a subperson that is
involved in a conversation, then there is an interlocutor who is another subperson involved in the
conversation.