Open-Ended Elaborations in Creative Metaphor - Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines - page 218

that in the ATT-Meta approach there are two broad sorts of correspondence: (i) view-
specific correspondences that are associated with particular metaphorical views, and
(ii) view-neutral mapping adjuncts that apply by default in any case of metaphorical
understanding and that build upon the effects of, and indefinitely extend the reach
of, the correspondences in (i).
A metaphorical view in ATT-Meta involves a small number of very general, high
level view-specific correspondences. In case of Mind as Having Parts that are Per-
sons , only two correspondences appear to be needed for a large array of examples.
They can intuitively be expressed as follows.
(C1) A person having some motive to believe/desire/intend/fear/like/… something
metaphorically corresponds to at least one subperson of that person having a
motive to believe/desire/intend/fear/like/… it.
(C2) A person believing/desiring/…something metaphorically corresponds to every
metaphorical subperson of that person believing/desiring/… it.
If we know from an utterance such as (5) that some subperson believes something,
then a fortiori that subperson presumably has a motive to believe it. Hence, via (C1),
the overall, real person has a motive to believe it as well.
One main point of the Mind as Having Parts that are Persons view is that it allows
different subpersons to have different beliefs (etc.) that conflict with each other. In
such a case the real person has motives to believe various conflicting things, without
actually believing any one of them. This sort of conflict is explicitly illustrated in
(7), but as we will see, (5) and (6) implicitly convey conflict.
View-specific correspondences such as (C1) and (C2) are couched in ATT-Meta as
correspondence rules that relate aspects of some source subject matter being used in a
pretence to aspects of some target subject matter in the reasoning space surrounding
the pretence. This surrounding space is usually the space concerning reality (the
reality space), but pretences can be nested within other pretences and other sorts of
space. Hence, correspondences in ATT-Meta serve to bridge, in general, between a
pretence space and a surrounding space.
(C1) and (C2) are more precisely glossed as follows. X is a variable standing for
some proposition. The “surround” is the space surrounding the pretence space. For
simplicity here I restrict the rules to dealing with just the mental state of belief.
(8) IF (in the surround) P is a person AND (within the pretence) P has one or more subpersons
THEN
(in the surround) P's having some motive to believe X
CORRESPONDS TO
(in the pretence) at least one subperson having a motive to believe X.
(9) IF (in the surround) P is a person AND (within the pretence) P has one or more subpersons
THEN
(in the surround) P's believing that X
CORRESPONDS TO
(in the pretence) all the subpersons believing that X.
The IF part of such rules acts as an appropriateness condition or guard .During
processing of a metaphorical utterance, it can become apparent that a person P is