Game Development Reference
In-Depth Information
Pirate
Gold
Vote
D
100
Yes*
E
0
No
If we were in a situation where three pirates are left, C, D, and E, then C would
know that D will perform the strategy above and offer E nothing in the next round.
Therefore, C will offer E one coin, and keep the rest for himself—D getting nothing.
E, being perfectly rational, also realizes that if it comes down to D and himself, he
is going to get nothing. Therefore, the one coin from C looks pretty good compared
to nothing, and E elects to vote for C's proposal.
Pirate
Gold
Vote
C
99
Yes*
D
0
No
E
1
Yes
Of course, in order for the three-pirate scenario to come about, something must
have gone amiss with the four-pirate scenario. If B, C, D, and E were remaining, B
(again, being perfectly rational) would know that the three-pirate proposal by C
would have gone as above. Therefore, he needs to placate D because D knows the next
round will not go well for him. If B offers D one coin, D will take that offer; it beats
getting nothing from C. Having bought D's vote with one coin, and knowing that he
has the deciding vote in a tie, B is no longer concerned with C or E's opinions and
offers them nothing. The vote will be two to two but with B's vote as the kicker.
Pirate
Gold
Vote
B
99
Yes*
C
0
No
D
1
Yes
E
0
No
Of course, B could have taken the same approach as C and offered E the one
gold coin. After all, since E knows he won't get any
more
than one coin if B is tossed
overboard, you would think that he would vote for that proposal. However, remem-
ber that according to rule 3 above, each pirate is eager to throw the others overboard.
In that case, he would be interested in throwing B overboard since he can get that
single gold coin from C in the next round
and
dispense with a rival. E would there-
fore
not
vote yes simply because he is offered one gold piece the same way that D
would. Knowing this, B would go with the original plan of buying D's vote.
