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does not necessarily hold about SP. Distinguishing between these two varieties
while justifying each, he writes, “[a] veridical paradox packs a surprise, but the
surprise quickly dissipates itself as we ponder the
proof
. A falsidical paradox
packs a surprise, but it is seen as a false alarm when we solve the
underlying
fallacy
.” [12, p. 9, emphasis is ours]. He argues that Godel's discovery and other
paradoxes in set theory are veridical paradoxes. We think that SP can be seen
as a case of veridical paradox as soon as we realize that the population data in
all tables follow necessarily from the sub-population data along with the proofs
we provided for the paradox to hold. To explore whether SP could fall under
the category of a falsidical paradox, consider Quine's own example of the latter.
According to him, paradoxes of Zeno are instances of falsidical paradoxes since
they rest on the fallacious assumption that “an infinite succession of intervals
must add up to an infinite interval.” Once we note this, it becomes clear that
the initial surprise about them was unwarranted. The same reasoning can be
offered for SP being a falsidical paradox. Our analysis shows that the surprise
SP packs rests on holding the dubious assumption that CP is unconditionally
applicable. Once we realize this, the paradoxical nature of SP disappears. So,
the unique feature of SP is that it is a paradox in both veridical and falsidical
senses. Therefore, there need not be a sharp distinction between these two types
of paradoxes as Quine once argued.
Two issues emerge from the preceding discussion. First, we rely on Quine's
definition of a paradox and how it fares with regard to SP; As we will see in
a moment Roy Sorensen thinks that Quine's definition is flawed as, according
to him, it is neither necessary nor sucient [13]. Second, whether it is possible
to advance a definition of a paradox which could include all types of paradoxes
including SP and the Liar paradox under its banner. The rest of this section will
be devoted to addressing these two issues.
Sorensen's method is to turn the definition of a paradox against what he takes
to be Quine's own “paradox” of radical translation. Quine sets out his “paradox”
by first assuming the possibility of a “radical translation” situation, in which nei-
ther speaker knows a word of the other's language. Consider a group of linguists
interested in understanding what the native speakers' utterances mean. Suppose
the speakers utter “gavagai.” The linguists observe the speakers, hear what they
utter, observe the conditions under which they utter a word or sentence, and de-
termine what they are looking at or pointing out when they utter. Armed with
such information, let's assume these linguists make a hypothesis that “gavagai”
means “rabbit”. In the same way, it is possible that another group of linguists
having the same evidence as the first group translates “gavagai” as “undetached
rabbit part.” Which one is the correct translation of “gavagai”? Based on this
thought experiment, Quine contends that radical translation is not possible as
meaning, here understood as referent, is indeterminate or at least undermined
by the totality of empirical evidence that is available. There is no way to know
whether the translation of “gavagai” as “rabbit” or “undetached rabbit part”
is the correct hypothesis. But the conclusion seems absurd; at least most of the
time, we know what others in our language group (or outside it) are referring
