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2.4
The
Śabda-pramān
a,
the Criterion of Verbal Knowledge
The
śabda
-
pramān
a,
the criterion of verbal knowledge, would not concern us in the
present paper. It is sufficed to say that an assertion
p
is a piece of verbal knowledge if it
expresses the perceptual, inferential or analogical knowledge it is supposed to express in
accord with the rules of everyday language and the rules of grammar. Similarly to the
other
pramān
as,
there are no general rules prior to and independent of habitual behaviors
for determining whether an assertion is a piece of knowledge. An assertion is a piece of
knowledge if what it expresses was provided by the
pratyaks
a,
the
anumāna
or the
upamāna-pramān
as
and if it expresses it in accord the rules of everyday language and
the rules of grammar.
3
Nyāya's Five-Limbs Logical Model for Ascertaining Sound
Arguments
The
pramān
as,
the criteria of knowledge, are peculiar and specific rules of usage derived
from habitual behaviors. There are no general rules prior to and independent of habitual
behaviors for determining whether a piece of perceptual, inferential, analogical or verbal
information is meaningful and can qualify as a piece of knowledge. However, the fact
that the criteria of knowledge are particular and behavior-dependent, by no means rend-
ers them impractical. For, albeit being particular and behavior-dependent, they are well
familiar and accepted by all.
Let us try to illustrate the above point. Disputants may disagree whether the argument
'ants are intelligent because they are capable of making decisions' is sound. But they must
agree that 'humans are intelligent because they are capable of making decisions' and that
there is 'nothing which is, one the hand, capable of making decisions and, on the other, not
intelligent'. Disagreement by one of the disputants over one of the propositions presented
above would entail that he does not fully understand what 'intelligence' and 'making deci-
sions' are; and it is impossible to conduct a fruitful discussion with someone who does not
fully understand the meaning of the concepts he wish to discuss. On the other hand, an all-
embracing agreement by all the disputants over the above propositions establishes the
avinabhāva
relation between 'the capability of making decisions' and 'intelligence'.
Similarly, disputants may disagree whether the argument 'penguins are birds because
they have feathers' is sound. But they must agree that 'parrots are birds because they have
feathers' and that 'nothing is known to have feathers and yet, not be a bird'. Disagreement
by one of the disputants over the above propositions necessarily entails that he does not
fully understand what 'birds' and 'feathers' are and it is impossible to conduct a fruitful
discussion with someone who does not fully understand the meaning of the concepts he
wishes to discuss. On the other hand, an all-embracing agreement by all the disputants
over the above propositions establishes the
avinabhāva
relation, the relation of meaning
between 'feathers' and 'birds'.
The principle which underlies Nyāya's five-limbs logical model is, then, that argu-
ments are sound only if they accord with the criteria set by the
pramān
as
. That is,
arguments are sound only if the concepts they employ accord with the rules of the use
of the things they denote in everyday life. If an argument fails to satisfy the said crite-
ria, it follows that it employs concepts contrary to the rules of their use, that is, it
follows that the concepts it employs assign to the things they denote, meaning which
