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2.3
The
Upamān
a-pramān
a,
the Criterion of Analogical Knowledge
Uddyotakara clarifies best his position regarding the
upamāna-pramān
a
in a discussion
he conducts with the
pūravpakśin
in Vārtika 1.1.39. The question Uddyotakara and the
pūravpakśin
are in disagreement over is how the similarity of things is determined. The
two things the similarity of which is examined in this particular discussion are 'the pro-
duction of dishes', on the one hand, and 'the production of sounds' on the other.
The
pūrvapaks
ain
first rejects the possibility that 'the production of dishes' is similar
to 'the production of sounds' because dishes and sounds are identical, for the obvious
reason that dishes and sounds are very different things. Next, he rejects the possibility
that 'the production of dishes' is similar to 'the production of sounds' because dishes and
sounds are produced in the same way. Dishes are produced, for example, by putting
vegetables, meat and spices in a casserole and by putting the casserole in the oven.
Sounds, on the other hand, are produced, for example, by playing a music instrument or
by using the vocal chords. Since the above two methods for determining similarity must
be rejected, the
pūrvapaks
ain
concludes that the similarity between 'the production of
dishes' and 'the production of sounds' must be the result of the following procedure: We
abstract the property 'being a product' from actual cases in which dishes and sounds are
produced, and conclude from the fact that this property qualifies both that 'the production
of dishes' and 'the production of sounds' are similar.
16
Uddyotakara replies that there is no criterion for determining similarity irrespective
of the habitual behaviors in which the two things whose similarity is examined are
involved.
17
Irrespective of the activity of playing chess, the actions of moving wooden
pieces and tapping the computer's keyboard would seem different; in the context of
playing chess, however, they could be regarded as similar - making a move in a game
of chess. Contrarily, two identical actions of putting a piece of paper in an envelope
may seem similar irrespective of the context in which they are performed. In
the proper context, however, one action could be a vote placed during an election and
the other, a love letter sent from a husband to his wife. There are no general rules
prior to and independent of habitual behaviors for determining whether two things
p
and
q
are similar. Determining whether
p
and
q
are similar is possible only with re-
spect to the rules of a certain behavior.
18
The
upamāna-pramān
a
, the criterion of ana-
logical knowledge, is that
p
and
q
are similar if the rules of the habitual behavior in
which they participate determine them to be similar.
16
NV 1.1.39, pp. 130, line 7 -
यदिप, यथा तथेयुपसंहारे कृ ते थेयनेन शदेन सवसामायं वा,
कृ तकवसामायं वािभधीयते? कृ तकव िवशेषो वा? सवसामायं तावत् न
युम्, तथेित
पदेशाशयवादित.
कृ तकविवशेषोsिप
न
युः,
अयथा
शदय
कृ तकवात्.
परशेषात्
कृ तकवसामायम्. त हेतुनैवोिमित - तदययुम्, उपनययोपमानाथवात्.
17
NV 1.1.39, pp. 130, line 12 -
कृ तकवसामायं तु शदसिधाविभधीयत इित िचिमदम्.
कृ तकवसिधाविभधीयत इित. शदेन च िविशयमाणं कथं सामायं भिवयित?
18
The idea to interpret Uddyotakara's point thus I have taken from Baker's and Hacker's essay
'Doing the right thing and doing the same thing' in BAKER-HACKER, pp.145 - 149
