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The following examples may help us understand what Uddyotakara is driving at.
Assume one sees smoke rising from her house. Assume, further, that in previous cases
she rushed over to her house upon seeing smoke, she found out that no fire was burn-
ing there. Would this prevent her from rushing over to her house this time? The an-
swer is absolutely not. She would again rush over, most probably with the same sense
of urgency. Now, assume one sees dark clouds approaching. Assume, further, that in
some previous cases she saw dark clouds approaching, she rushed outside to take the
laundry in, only to find out later that the clouds produced no rain. Would this prevent
her from rushing to take the laundry in this time? The answer is probably not. She
would again rush outside fearing that the coming rain would wet her clothes.
What the above examples show is that we don't assume the presence of fire upon
perceiving smoke because in previous cases we always perceived smoke alongside
fire. Rather, we react to smoke as if we see fire because we were taught to act this
way.
15
Reacting to fire upon seeing only smoke has repeatedly proven itself useful in
saving lives, property, time and effort. The inference of fire from smoke is a pattern
of behavior we were taught to follow. It is this pattern of behavior from which the
relation of
avinabhāva
between fire and smoke is derived from. A relation of
avinabhāva
is therefore, a relation of meaning. We have learned to associate the
meaning of 'smoke' with the meaning of 'fire', we have learned that part of what
'smoke' means is that it indicates 'fire', when we have learned habitual behaviors
which involve 'smoke' and 'fire'. The invariable concomitance of fire and smoke is
based on the fact that there is a use we can make of 'qualifying smoke by fire' and not
on a relation between smoke and fire which is prior to and independent of habitual
human behaviors. Generally speaking, the question whether maintaining that 'the
li
ṅ
ga
' is invariably concomitant with the
sādhya
' is meaningful, whether it is a case of
knowledge, can be resolved by the
pratyaks
a-pramān
a
. If there is a use we make of
'the
li
ṅ
ga
as invariably qualified by the
sādhya
' in habitual behaviors, then maintain-
ing that 'the
li
ṅ
ga
is invariably concomitant with the
sādhya
' is meaningful, it is a case
of knowledge.
So, provided one is acquainted with the habitual behaviors in which the
paks
a
, the
li
ṅ
ga
and the
sādhya
are used, the fact that 'the
paks
a
is qualified by the
li
ṅ
ga'
and the
fact that 'the
li
ṅ
ga
is invariably qualified by the
sādhya
' are immediately given to him
by the
pratyaks
a
-
pramān
a
. However, the inference 'the
paks
a
is qualified by the
sādhya
' does not 'naturally' follow from the above two perceptual facts. For inference
is also a form of habitual behavior that one needs to learn, by exercise, train and drill
and by developing skills and techniques. Only one who knows how to infer would
accept that 'the
paks
a
is qualified by the
sādhya
' after he is presented with the facts
that 'the
paks
a
is qualified by the
li
ṅ
ga
' and that 'the
li
ṅ
ga
is invariably qualified by
the
sādhya
'. It is possible that one would be presented with the facts that 'the
paks
a
is
qualified by the
li
ṅ
ga
' and that 'the
li
ṅ
ga
is invariably qualified by the
sādhya
' and
yet, refuse to admit that 'the
paks
a
is qualified by the
sādhya
'. What this refusal de-
monstrates, however, is this person's incapacity to infer.
15
My above interpretation of inference is inspired by Baker and Hacker commentary on Witt-
genstein's Philosophical investigations. See Baker, G. P. & Hacker P.M. S. (2009), p. 88-90.
