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only once the cooking session began and that they would cease to be a stove and a
dish as soon as the cooking session completed, which is equally preposterous.
Kāraka-śabdas
, Uddyotakara concludes, do not refer to the constituents of an on-
going activity but rather, they express the role a thing plays, the purpose it fulfills or
the use we make of it in a habitual behavior. The word 'cook' expresses the role that
the agent of cooking plays in the habitual behavior of 'cooking', the word 'stove' ex-
presses the function the instrument of cooking fulfills in 'cooking' and the word 'dish'
expresses the thing which the activity of cooking produces.
Kāraka-śabdas
, the terms
we use to describe the activity which accomplishes a thing
p
, express as a matter of
fact the use we make of
p
in a certain habitual behavior. So, instead of saying that by
pointing out an activity we describe as
p
and only by pointing out such activity, we can
unequivocally determine that
p
is meaningful, we can now say that by pointing out a
use we can make of
p
in a habitual behavior and only by pointing out such usage, we
can unequivocally determine that
p
is meaningful. In other words, usage determines the
meaning of things or, the meaning of things is their usage. The meaning of a tree is that
which we can build staff out of, cut down and climb on. Knowing what a 'tree' is,
grasping the true meaning of 'tree', depends on our acquaintance with the habitual
behaviors in which trees are used. We become acquainted with the usage of things in
habitual behaviors by learning these habitual behaviors - a process which requires
much exercise, train and drill, the development of skills and techniques. The true
meaning of things is given by their usage in habitual behavior and being acquainted
with the usage of things in habitual behavior requires learning these behaviors.
Uddyotakara reveals another important aspect of his theory of
pramān
a
during a dis-
cussion in which he explains Vātsyāyana use of the term
'artha
-
pratipatti'
, 'perception of
an object'. The
pūrvaks
in
asks Uddyotakara to explain why Vātsyāyana uses the word
artha
, 'object'. Perception is always the perception of an object, so the explicit mention of
the word 'object' seems to be redundant. The word
artha
is included in the statement,
Uddyotakara replies, for the purpose of precluding the perception which has the
pramā
ṇ
a
as its object. The objects which
pramān
a
provides, Uddyotakara explains, reveal purpos-
es that human beings are interested in pursuing. Contrarily, there can be no purpose in
pursuing
pramā
ṇ
a
.
11
Pramān
a
pertains to habitual ways in which things are used. These
habitual ways are courses of action people fixed because they have repeatedly proven
their capacity to accomplish the purposes they were supposed to accomplish. Doubting
that things can be used in the ways they were over and over successfully used before is
senseless. It is senseless for people who are capable of climbing trees or cutting trees
down to question whether a tree can be climbed on or cut down. Someone who disagrees
that a tree can be climbed on or cut down does not fully understand what a tree is. People
do not doubt the habitual ways in which they use things because doubting the successful
ways in which they use things is senseless. Since the habitual ways in which things
are used are not doubted, no purpose can be achieved by pursuing the
pramān
a
. The
pramān
a
is, therefore, not fit to serve as an object of perception. More importantly, the
fact that the habitual ways in which we use things are beyond doubt establishes them as
pramān
a
.
11
NV 1.1.1, p. 7, line 1
अथहणं माणिवषयितपिितषेधाथम्. यतो न माणिवषयाितपिः
पुषिमितकततायां योजयित, क वथय तथाभाविवषया. यदायमथय तथाभावं ितपते, अथ
वतत इित.
-
