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mental processes which produce them.
1
These researchers were certain that the Indian
philosophical debate concerning logic was conducted within the confines of the above
conceptual framework.
Conversely, my research shows that at least one Indian school of thought, the Nyāya,
did not operate within the confines of the said framework. The criteria of knowledge
Nyāya thinkers proposed were entirely different. Their proposed criteria were based on
the following principle: The rules of grammar allow us to speak as objects of knowledge
only of things we know how to use, things which play a role and fulfill a function in
human life. The meaning of a tree is given to it by the various ways in which it is used.
Tree is that thing we built stuff out of, that thing we use to warm our houses with, that
thing the fruits of which we eat and under the shade of which we take refuge. The mean-
ing of things is given to them by the rules of their use or to state the same thing different-
ly, the rules of the use of things which we learn when we learn human behavior
determine their meanings. The criteria of knowledge are then, according to Nyāya, the
rules of the use of things in habitual behaviors. This means that according to Nyāya, it
makes no sense to speak as objects of knowledge of things we don't know how to use,
things there are no habitual behaviors in which they participate and accordingly, no rules
for their use.
It is important to note that Indian logic was not formal.
2
Its subject matters were not
abstract variables, logical symbols and propositions whose forms have been separated
from their contents. The subject matters of Indian logic were everyday entities and con-
cepts. The issue which stood at the center of the Indian philosophical debate regarding
the
pramān
a
, I suggest, was the following: On the one hand, there were thinkers who
believed the rules of logic were prior to and independent of habitual everyday human
behaviors. On the other hand, there were the Naiyāyikas who believed the rules of logic
were derived from habitual everyday human behaviors and the rules of usage they pro-
vided. Nyāya was and still is a school of thought that claims that arguments which are not
grounded in well known, well familiar courses of action, are not logical, not rational.
Since Nyāya logic was not formal, since its subject matters were everyday entities and
concepts, it considered only arguments which were sound and meaningful, arguments
which conformed to rules of usage in everyday life, to be strictly speaking, logical and
rational.
The main purpose of Nyāya philosophical project was to develop a logical model for
ascertaining whether arguments were sound. This logical model was designed to deter-
mine whether arguments conformed to the rules of the use of things in everyday habitual
behaviors. The model operated as follows: It examined whether arguments satisfied the
1
MATILAL 2002, pp. 368 - Matilal states that: "
Prāman
a
is what 'makes' knowledge. Since
knowledge is always an episode (an inner event in Indian philosophy, in fact, a sub-category
of mental occurrence),
prāman
a
has also a causal role to play. It is the "most efficient" cause
of the knowledge episode. Knowledge yields determination of an object
x
or a fact that
p
(
ar-
tha-parichchedda
) as the result, and
prāman
a
is "instrumental" in bringing about that result.
This is the causal role of a
prāman
a
. In MOHANTY 1992, pp. 229, a similar position is pre-
sented by Mohanty. He states that " A sort of causal theory of knowledge is built into the
prāman
a
theory: a true cognition must not only be true to its object, but must also be generat-
ed in the right manner, i.e. by the appropriate causes.
2
For further reading on the matter see MOHANTY, pp. 100-127, MATILAL 1986,
pp. 118-127 and MATILAL 1990, pp. 23 -28, MATILAL 1998, pp. 1-22
